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The year the Chicago-Kent College of Law was found-ed, a new consumer product 
arrived on the scene: the portable 
camera. Before then, taking some-
one’s photo was a big deal. A person 
would get dressed up and go to a stu-
dio. Photos were not taken without a 
person’s permission.  But the porta-
ble camera changed all that—and in 
the process led to the development 
of legal rights of privacy that endure 
today.
An 1890 newspaper article 
warned:
Have you seen the Kodak fiend? 
Well, he has seen you. He caught 
your expression yesterday while 
you were innocently talking at the 
Post Office. He has taken you at a 
disadvantage and transfixed your 
uncouth position and passed it on 
to be laughed at by friend and foe 
alike. His click is heard on every 
hand. He is merciless and omni-
present and has as little conscience 
and respect for proprieties as the 
verist hoodlum. What with Kodak 
fiends and phonographs and elec-
tric search lights, modern inven-
tive genius is certainly doing its 
level best to lay us all out bare to 
the gaze of our fellow-men.




Advertisement for the Kodak camera, c. 1890.
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Snapchat and YouTube today, the 
portable camera fundamentally 
changed the way other people and 
institutions could peer into people’s 
lives. But the issues raised by today’s 
cutting-edge technologies are similar 
to those raised by the Kodak fiend.
In the late 1800s a lawyer, Samuel 
Warren, married the daughter of a 
Senator. He was unprepared for the 
incessant media attention to their 
union, fueled by the newly-devel-
oped portable camera. After his chil-
dren were born, paparazzi would 
snap photos of the babies when the 
family took walks down the street. 
Annoyed, he thought about what 
legal recourse he might have. Were 
there any legal precedents for a 
“right to be let alone”? He pondered 
the issue with a friend from law 
school, Louis Brandeis. They could 
have suggested that people no lon-
ger had a right to be left alone be-
cause technologies could now track 
and record what they did. Instead 
they noted that the intrusiveness of 
technologies like the portable cam-
era made it even more important 
for people to have control over in-
formation about themselves. “The 
intensity and complexity of life at-
tendant upon advancing civilization 
has rendered necessary some retreat 
from the world,” they wrote, “so that 
solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual; but 
modern enterprise and invention 
have, through invasion upon his pri-
vacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could 
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”
Their article, “The Right to Pri-
vacy,” was published in 1890 in the 
Harvard Law Review. They demon-
strated that a privacy right had a 
basis in fundamental Constitutional 
values, such as the right to refuse to 
testify against oneself, and common 
law principles, such as the “right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”
“The protection afforded to 
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
. . . is merely an instance of the en-
forcement of the most general right 
of the individual to be let alone,” 
they said. “It is like the right not to 
be assaulted or beaten, the right not 
to be imprisoned, the right not to be 
maliciously prosecuted, the right not 
to be defamed.”
Their ideas were incorporated 
into law through the creation of four 
distinct legal actions for invasion of 
privacy: for intruding on someone’s 
seclusion, for publicly disclosing 
private information, for putting a 
person in a “false light” in the public 
eye, and for appropriating someone’s 
name or likeness for commercial use. 
They advocated that information 
about and photos of people could 
be disseminated if they had con-
sented or if the matter was of legit-
imate public interest. Since then, the 
fundamental Constitutional right 
to privacy has additionally been in-
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terpreted to include a right to make 
important personal decisions, such 
as whether to use contraception or 
whether to homeschool your child.
The mode of analysis of the two 
Boston lawyers from a century ago 
has been used to analyze each new 
technology that has reached the 
courts. How does it affect the indi-
vidual and society? How do funda-
mental legal values help to protect 
the individual when the technology 
is used? As each new technology has 
been adopted—including forensic 
technologies, medical technologies, 
and computer technologies—the ap-
plication of fundamental values has 
been used to protect, and often ex-
pand, people’s privacy rights. Some-
times courts, lacking the compre-
hensive analysis of technology like 
the one undertaken by Warren and 
Brandeis, took missteps when they 
first encountered a technology. But 
ultimately, privacy prevailed.
When Charles Katz entered a 
public phone booth in 1965, he never 
imagined that cops would tap the 
phone line. The cops charged him 
with placing illegal bets—and he 
protested that they had infringed the 
Fourth Amendment limits on gov-
ernmental intrusion into a person’s 
private life. The trial judge said that 
wiretapping didn’t violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the Founding 
Fathers drafted the Constitutional 
provision to honor people’s privacy 
in their homes. In this case, the po-
lice hadn’t trespassed into his home. 
In fact, there had even been a Su-
preme Court decision on the matter, 
back in 1928, when cops had used 
earlier wiretap technology to learn 
that someone was violating Prohibi-
tion.
In that earlier case, Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), 
the five-justice majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court had held that a 
“The Kodak Fiend,” Hawaiian Gazette, December 9, 1890, 
Chronicling America Collection, Library of Congress.
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bootlegger’s privacy hadn’t been 
invaded and he hadn’t been forced 
to incriminate himself because, al-
though police had recorded the calls 
he was making from his home, the 
wiretap equipment had been placed 
on phone lines outside his home. 
Writing for the dissent was none 
other than Louis Brandeis, who was 
then a Supreme Court justice. He ar-
gued that fundamental values had to 
be applied to new technologies. He 
noted that when the Constitution 
was adopted, “force and violence”—
torture and breaking into people’s 
houses—were the only ways that the 
government had to obtain private 
information about people. The Con-
stitution protected against force and 
violence. But, said Brandeis, “discov-
ery and invention have made it pos-
sible for the government, by means 
far more effective than stretching 
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure 
in court of what is whispered in the 
closet. . . . The progress of science 
in furnishing the government with 
means of espionage is not likely to 
stop with wiretapping. Ways may 
some day be developed by which the 
government, without removing pa-
pers from secret drawers, can repro-
duce them in court, and by which it 
will be enabled to expose to a jury 
the most intimate occurrences of 
the home.” According to Brandeis, the 
Constitution’s fundamental value of 
privacy and the right not to incriminate 
yourself needed to be applied not only 
to “what has been, but of what may be.”
Forty years after the Olmstead decision, when Charles Katz’s 
case was appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the majority of the 
justices applied Brandeis’s logic. 
Even though Charles Katz was us-
ing a public phone booth, the Court 
said that the Constitutional right of 
privacy “protects people, not places.” 
What a person seeks to preserve as 
private, even in a public place, may 
be Constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court protected 
Katz’s privacy by enunciating a legal 
test that is still used today: Did the 
person have an “expectation of pri-
vacy” and was that an expectation 
that society was willing to protect? 
As a result, police need to get a war-
rant, based on probable cause, before 
they tap someone’s phone.
The march of law enforcement 
technology continued, and in 2001, 
a new forensic technology reached 
the court. A federal agent suspected 
Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana. 
Since growing pot indoors requires 
high-intensity lamps, the agent sat in 
a car across from the home and used 
an Agema Thermovision 210 ther-
mal imager to scan Kyllo’s home. The 
scan showed that the roof over the 
garage and a side wall of the home 
were relatively hot compared to the 
rest of the home and substantially 
warmer than neighboring homes 
in the triplex. The agent concluded 
that Kyllo was growing pot and con-
vinced a judge to allow him to search 
Kyllo’s home. The agent found pot, 
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and Kyllo was convicted on a drug 
charge. Because the thermal scan-
ner did not physically intrude on the 
house and did not show any private 
human activities, the trial court said 
that it hadn’t infringed Kyllo’s Con-
stitutional rights.
The appellate court, too, held that 
Kyllo had shown no subjective ex-
pectation of privacy because he had 
made no attempt to conceal the heat 
escaping from his home, and “even 
if he had, there was no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the imager ‘did not expose 
any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’ 
only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the 
roof and exterior wall.’”
When the U.S. Supreme Court 
took the case, it reversed Kyllo’s 
conviction. “It would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely un-
affected by the advance of technol-
ogy,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia. 
“Where, as here, the Government 
uses a device that is not in general 
public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physi-
cal intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.”
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012), assessed the use of a 
GPS tracking device installed on a 
car driven by Antoine Jones, a D.C. 
nightclub owner. Jones was the tar-
get of a narcotics investigation by 
police and the FBI. The Court held 
9 to 0 that the twenty-eight-day war-
rantless use of the GPS violated the 
Fourth Amendment. In her concur-
rence, Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out how the fundamental right to 
privacy was salient even in today’s 
world. “GPS monitoring generates 
a precise, comprehensive record of 
a person’s public movements that 
reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, re-
ligious, and sexual associations,” 
wrote Sotomayor, adding, “People 
disclose the phone numbers they 
dial or text to their cellular provid-
ers; the URLs that they visit and the 
e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries 
and medication they purchase to 
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt 
that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of ev-
ery Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.” Justice 
Sotomayor also was concerned that 
“[a]wareness that the government 
may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms.”
Contemporary medical technol-
ogies, such as genetic testing, have 
also raised disputes about the reach 
of privacy principles. When genet-
ic testing became possible, people 
were tested without their knowledge 
or consent. Doctors and researchers 
would use blood that people had 
Lori Andrews 39
given to labs for routine cholesterol 
or pregnancy tests and perform ad-
ditional testing, without the person’s 
consent, for everything from breast 
cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. The 
argument was, what’s the harm? The 
person had already been pricked; the 
additional tests involved no addi-
tional intervention. And even if the 
blood was collected anew—as in a 
forensic DNA test—blood tests were 
safe and noninvasive.
But then employers and insurers 
started discriminating against healthy 
people based on their genetic predis-
position to future disease. With cer-
tain genetic mutations, for exam-
ple, some women had a higher risk 
of developing breast cancer than 
other women. Even with those mu-
tations, half the women would not 
develop breast cancer. Some women 
didn’t want to know whether they 
had the mutations or not. They said 
they would feel like they had a time 
bomb ticking away inside them. But 
employers and insurers wanted that 
information to make their decisions. 
There were no legal limits on what 
could be done with that information.
During routine physicals, an 
employer in California asked the 
company doctor to surreptitiously 
test the female employees to see if 
they were pregnant and the Afri-
can-American employees to see if 
they carried the sickle cell anemia 
gene mutation. The results were not 
disclosed to the employees, but they 
were put in to their personnel files.
When the existence of the files 
leaked, the employees sued. The trial 
court dismissed the case, saying that 
the test was a modest intrusion, no 
more than what people usually un-
dergo in a physical. But the appellate 
court held that genes contain per-
sonal information that is protected 
by the fundamental right to privacy. 
“One can think of few subject areas 
more personal and more likely to 
implicate privacy interests than that 
of one’s . . . genetic make-up,” wrote 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Law-
rence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Since 
then, Congress has passed a law, the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act, specifically prohibiting 
employers and insurers from dis-
criminating against people based on 
the results of genetic tests. People’s 
privacy rights include the right not to 
have genetic information generated 
about them or used against them.
Even computer technologies that 
collect data about people have been 
subject to a fundamental rights anal-
ysis. When Judge Robert Bork was 
nominated for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1987, Michael Dolan, a 
Washington, D.C. newspaper re-
porter, attempted to discredit him by 
publishing his video store rental re-
cords. In today’s world, Judge Bork’s 
choices seem tame: British movies, 
Bond movies, costume dramas. The 
reporter was disappointed not to see 
legal movies such as 12 Angry Men 
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or To Kill a Mockingbird. Instead, 
Judge Bork had rented “only one 
truly court-related tape”: The Star 
Chamber.
Bork did not get the Supreme 
Court nomination. But the publi-
cation of his video rentals did get 
the attention of Congress. “It is no-
body’s business what Oliver North 
or Robert Bork or Griffin Bell or Pat 
Leahy watch on television or read or 
think about when they get home,” 
said Senator Pat Leahy. “In an era 
of interactive television cables, the 
growth of computer checking and 
check-out counters, of security sys-
tems and telephones, all lodged to-
gether in computers, it would be rel-
atively easy at some point to give a 
profile of a person and tell what they 
buy in a store, what kind of food 
they like, what sort of television pro-
grams they watch, who are some of 
the people they telephone. . . . I think 
that is wrong. I think that really is 
Big Brother, and I think it is some-
thing that we have to guard against.”
Senator Paul Simon agreed. 
“There is no denying that the com-
puter age has revolutionized our 
world.  Over the past twenty years 
we have seen remarkable chang-
es in the way each one of us goes 
about our lives. Our children learn 
through computers. We bank by ma-
chine. We watch movies in our living 
rooms. These technological innova-
tions are exciting and as a nation 
we should be proud of the accom-
plishments we have made. Yet, as we 
continue to move ahead, we must 
protect time honored values that are 
so central to this society, particularly 
our right to privacy. The advent of 
the computer means not only that 
we can be more efficient than ever 
before, but that we have the ability to 
be more intrusive than ever before. 
Every day Americans are forced to 
provide businesses and others per-
sonal information without having 
any control over where that infor-
mation goes. . . . These records are 
a window into our loves, likes, and 
dislikes.”
The legislators applied the funda-
mental Constitutional right to pri-
vacy and passed a law in 1988 for-
bidding disclosure of people’s video 
rental records (or, in this day and 
age, what they watch on Netflix). 
The bill prohibits video stores from 
disclosing “personally identifiable in-
formation”—information that links 
the customer or patron to particular 
materials or services. In the event of an 
unauthorized disclosure, an individual 
may bring a civil action for damages.
The concerns raised by the dis-closure of Bork’s video records 
are mild when compared to today’s 
digital invasion of privacy. A bil-
lion people have joined Facebook, 
a population only slightly smaller 
than either of the two largest coun-
tries, India and China. Marketing 
companies, political candidates, law 
enforcement agencies, employers, and 
other social institutions peer through 
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the keyholes of people’s lives by as-
sessing the information and photos 
that individuals post and that third 
parties post about them. Even more 
troubling, data aggregators use sur-
reptitious tracking mechanisms to 
follow people across the web and use 
that information to make judgments 
about them. If a woman does a Google 
search for old guitars and then seeks 
a credit card, she will be offered a 
credit card with less advantageous 
terms—not because her credit is 
bad, but because garage rock bands 
in general are less likely to pay off 
their credit cards. If she has a pho-
to of herself with a wineglass in her 
hand, she may be denied a job. Sev-
enty-five percent of employers look 
at people’s social network presence; 
one-third reject people who have al-
cohol in a Facebook photo. And, as 
with past technologies, courts and 
legislatures have been slow to pro-
tect privacy, initially holding that 
privacy rights are lost “on affirmative 
keystroke.”
In just the past two years, how-
ever, courts and lawmakers have 
begun to protect freedom of expres-
sion and privacy on social networks. 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011), 
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School Dis-
trict, 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011), the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that public high school students had 
a First Amendment right that cov-
ered their posts on social networks 
even if those posts were critical of 
school administrators. And a few 
state legislatures—including that of 
Illinois—passed laws prohibiting 
employers from asking for the social 
network passwords of an employee 
or a job applicant. That Illinois law 
went into effect 125 years after Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law opened its 
doors. The Illinois governor came to 
the campus to sign the bill into law 
Chicago-Kent College of Law Facebook page, retrieved Feb. 5, 2013, from https://www.facebook.com.
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and was introduced by a Chicago- 
Kent student who was working on 
internet privacy issues.
The Warren and Brandeis article 
not only created a legal framework 
that still applies today to safeguard 
people’s privacy, it also established 
a method for judging new technolo-
gies. The authors analyzed how fun-
damental values inherent in the U.S. 
Constitution and common law pro-
vide a basis to make judgments about 
new technologies. They also assessed 
how new technologies affected indi-
viduals, institutions, and the larger 
society. Warren and Brandeis did 
not suggest that individuals adapt to 
each new technology, but instead ad-
vocated that society assure that each 
technology was employed in a way 
that was consistent with fundamen-
tal societal values.
When Brandeis was appointed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court 26 years 
after his privacy article appeared, 
he continued to champion the ap-
plication of Constitutional values to 
modern technologies. He also wrote 
about the nature of a Constitution. 
“Time works changes, brings into 
existence new conditions and pur-
poses. Therefore a principle, to be 
vital, must be capable of wider appli-
cation than the mischief which gave 
it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
Constitutions. They are not ephem-
eral enactments, designed to meet 
passing occasions. They are, to use 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 
‘designed to approach immortality 
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as nearly as human institutions can 
approach it.’ The future is their care, 
and provision for events of good and 
bad tendencies of which no proph-
ecy can be made. In the application 
of a Constitution, therefore, our con-
templation cannot be only of what 
has been but of what may be.”
When the law school opened its 
doors 125 years ago, it would have 
been difficult to imagine the high-
tech world of today. But by learning 
about cutting edge technologies as 
well as fundamental legal principles, 
the students at IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law have been well edu-
cated, in every era, to face their gen-
eration’s legal challenges. ◆
